Sykes-Picot Agreement Text

More than a year after the agreement with Russia, British and French representatives, Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot, have drafted another secret agreement on the future spoils of the First World War. Picot represented a small group determined to ensure France`s control of Syria; For its part, Sykes asked the United Kingdom to compensate for the influence in the region. The deal largely overlooked the future growth of Arab nationalism, which the British government and military used to their advantage against the Turks. Very little of the Sykes-Picot agreement was implemented, and the borders that were eventually set hardly resemble the lines drawn – more exquisitely imperially – by the two diplomats whose main objective was to decide how Britain and France would divide the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire. Paradoxically, it is the failure of the agreement that makes it relevant to understand the forces that currently threaten the disintegration of the Levantine States and that could reconfigure the region. If Britain and France had succeeded in developing the Levant as they wished, the agreement could be seen as the product of a past colonial era, of little relevance to the present. But they weren`t. The actions of Arab and Turkish nationalists, the demands of minorities, the ambitions of politicians, the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the bankruptcy of Britain and France after the war marked a Levant imagined differently by that of the two diplomats. On the eve of Sykes-Picot`s centenary in 2016, the media[109] and science[110] generated great interest in the long-term effects of the agreement. The agreement is often referred to as an «artificial» border in the Middle East, «without taking into account ethnic or sectarian characteristics, [which] has led to endless conflicts.» [111] The question of the extent to which Sykes-Picot actually marked the borders of the modern Middle East is controversial. [112] [113] In his doctoral dissertation, Gibson discusses the role that oil then played in British strategic thinking and mentions Mosul Vilayet as the largest potential oil field and France`s 1918 agreement to accept its adherence to Iraq`s mandate (the Clemenceau Lloyd George Agreement) in exchange for a «share of the oil and British support elsewhere.» [53] These and other issues are not unnecessary speculation. .

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